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INTRODUCTION 
 
ne of the major demands of public sector unions in recent years 
has been to gain greater control over the pension plans in which 
their members’ retirement savings are invested. While union 
control of pension plan assets is not unusual in the private sector, during the past 
decade there has been a significant shift in the public sector, as a number of 
provincial governments, most notably British Columbia, have agreed to 
restructure plan governance on the basis of joint trusteeship.  
Public sector unions have wanted a voice in pension issues for a number 
of distinct reasons. One has been to be able to deal with administrative issues 
and, particularly, to ensure that appeals and other concerns of plan members, 
including retirees, are handled fairly. A second is to determine the design of 
pension benefits, including the priority given to options such as early retirement, 
health benefits, out of province medical coverage and so forth. A third is to deal 
with pension surpluses/deficits and, particularly, the issue of contribution 
holidays which public employers have been prone to take, unilaterally, during 
periods of high investment returns. However, a final reason for seeking joint 
control of pension plans has been to have a say in investment policy. This reason 
reflects, at least in part, the view that labour’s values and priorities should play a 
role in shaping investment decisions.1 
The focus of this article is to examine some of the key investment policy 
issues now facing public sector unions and the trustees they appoint. Specifically, 
the article will examine the implications of investments in Public Private 
Partnerships (P-3s). Examples of such investments include: transportation 
projects (highways, bridges, rail lines, rapid transit), hospitals and other health 
services, schools and educational institutions, municipal water and sewer 
systems, electrical utilities, recreational services and other projects that, 
historically, have been within the public sector.  
O
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Union trustees are already grappling with the question of whether to use 
their investment funds to finance government privatization initiatives and 
infrastructure P-3s, as their investment advisors argue that these are among the 
very few new investment opportunities in a Canadian stock market 
characterized by a diminishing number of investment options. Integration with 
the US under NAFTA has resulted in many Canadian companies being sold to 
foreign investors, while others have simply moved their head offices – and stock 
market listings – to the US.2 
Accordingly, pension investment advisors are recommending that 
pension trustees join various consortia involved in financing the purchase of 
privatized crown corporations and other public assets and/or construction of 
new P-3 projects. The way unions deal with this question has significant 
ramifications for union trustees, plan members, unions, in both the public and 
private sectors, and the wider public. 
This paper argues that public sector union trustees should be very wary 
of making such investments. Public sector unions have strongly criticized 
privatization initiatives as a threat to public sector jobs and the quality of 
services. They have also challenged these initiatives as poor public policy – 
policy that is fundamentally against the public interest.3 They risk undermining 
their credibility on this policy position if they also attempting to profit from 
investments in the privatization initiatives they oppose.  
However, their approach should not be based solely on the direct 
interests of their members or their concerns about promoting good public policy. 
From a more narrow investment perspective, there is considerable evidence that 
many of these initiatives are inherently risky – more so than many conventional 
investment opportunities. In addition, given that privatization and P-3 initiatives 
are likely to remain only a small proportion of pension portfolios, it is a mistake 
for pension trustees to focus too much attention on an area that is likely to have 
only the most marginal impact on the overall returns of their portfolios.4 
 
THE NATURE OF PRIVATIZATION INVESTMENT PROPOSALS  
 
Perhaps the most useful way to begin this analysis is with an examination 
of the kinds of privatization initiatives currently being promoted by 
governments and organizations representing the business sector – and advocated 
by some investment advisors.  
The most clear-cut approach to privatization involves the outright sale to 
the private sector of a publicly owned entity. We have seen a number of these 
initiatives, particularly with respect to provincial and federal crown 
corporations, such as BC Rail, Canadian National Rail (CN), parts of the former 
Ontario Hydro, and many others. Public sector unions have strongly opposed 
such initiatives both because of the negative impact on their members and 
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because of the adverse public policy impacts for the general public.5 However, 
there have been various other types of privatization, particularly in the form of 
outsourcing services, such as the BC Hydro transfer of approximately 2000 jobs 
to Bermuda based Accenture. 
A second – and much publicized – approach to privatization involves 
private investment in new infrastructure projects – normally described as P-3s or 
Public Private Partnerships. Although the absolute number and dollar value of 
these initiatives remains significantly less than that of the more traditional 
privatizations, there is a great deal of pressure from the business sector for new 
public projects to be financed and operated in this way, especially as the number 
of candidates for more traditional privatization initiatives diminishes.  
Public/Private Partnerships (P-3s) are joint ventures in which the private 
sector becomes the lead actor in the provision of public infrastructure, facilities, 
programs or services. Funding is normally from government through contractual 
arrangements that provide an ongoing public revenue stream, or from various 
types of user fees that the private proponent is permitted to charge for the use of 
its programs or services. While the forms of P-3s vary, they generally include: 
private financing, design, construction, operation, maintenance, staffing and 
ownership. Contracts are generally long term – often 20 to 40 years – effectively 
binding future governments to financial commitments that span a generation or 
more and often are written in a way to make it financially difficult for future 
governments to bring these assets or programs back into the public sector.  
P-3s differ from normal design and build construction contracts between 
a public sector owner and a private sector constructor because they use the 
private sector for provision of financing, operations, staffing and other major 
decisions.  
Examples of recent P-3 projects (or proposals) include: the Abbotsford 
Hospital; the Richmond/Airport/Vancouver rapid transit line (RAV line); The 
Sierra Yoyo Desan (SYD) Road, the Brampton and Royal Ottawa Hospitals; the 
Moncton to Fredericton toll highway; P-3 schools in Nova Scotia, a proposed 
Seymour water treatment plant in BC; Ontario’s controversial toll Highway 407, 
Quebec’s new super-hospital project and many more.  
There has been a major push in recent years by business and government-
sponsored organizations, such as the Canadian Council for Public Private 
Partnerships (and its provincial counterparts such as Partnerships BC), to 
promote P-3 infrastructure projects.  
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There has also been a push to have pension plans invest in such projects. 
A recent paper authored by construction contractors and unions in Ontario 
reflects this approach: 
 
This paper suggests that a solution to Ontario's infrastructure funding deficit lies, 
in part, in the declared intention by the Province's major public pension funds to 
invest more of their assets in infrastructure. It recommends innovative financing 
approaches developed with the pension funds as an important step toward 
closing the infrastructure gap (From Executive Summary).6 
 
A brief surfing of the numerous web sites now devoted to P-3s indicates that 
such sentiments are widespread among the proponents of P-3s.7 
 
THE RATIONALE FOR INVESTING IN P-3s 
 
The public policy concerns about P-3s are not normally an issue for private 
investors interested in maximizing the returns on their capital. However, faced 
with the challenge of meeting the target rate of return of their plans, some 
investment advisors have recommended that union trustees support investments 
in P-3s. Their arguments can be summarized as follows: 
 
• There is a shortage in Canada of high return/acceptable risk investments 
for pension plans, especially as NAFTA-based integration has 
dramatically reduced the number of viable Canadian-owned companies 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). Pension plans need 
additional investment opportunities within Canada and P-3s fit the bill. 
• P-3s can generate very favourable returns with a reasonable level of risk 
for pension plans, thus helping them meet their rate of return targets.  
• Governments are increasingly supportive of P-3s, signalling to investors 
that they intend to configure many future projects in the form of P-3s. 
Hence opportunities will continue to expand in the future.  
• Canadians need new infrastructure investment. Given the reluctance of 
governments to take on new debt, pensions can be a major source of 
capital for such investment  
• By purchasing P3 assets public sector pension plans can maintain 
Canadian ownership of major infrastructure projects.  
• New P-3 funded infrastructure creates economic benefits, including 
construction employment, even if ownership and operation of the 
projects is private. Union members in the building trades can benefit from 
this investment. 
• Pension trustees have a fiduciary obligation to seek out investments with 
the highest rate of return, regardless of other public policy or ethical 
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considerations and if P-3s fit this profile, pension plans are obligated to 
invest in them. It is not up to pension trustees to debate the public policy 
implications of their investments; their sole obligation is to maximize the 
returns to plan members. 
 
However, these arguments are not nearly as telling as their proponents 
believe. There are three distinct sets of reasons why unions should be suspicious 
of funding P-3 investments. First, they may pose a threat to the jobs of public 
sector workers who are contributors to these pension plans. Second, they involve 
supporting initiatives that are simply bad public policy and not in the public 
interest. Third, they are more risky than P-3 proponents acknowledge 
 
INVESTMENTS IN PRIVATIZATION AND P-3 INITIATIVES MAY 
THREATEN UNION JOBS 
 
Public sector pension plans, by definition, are rooted in the public sector. 
Plan members are current and retired public sector workers. Insofar as P-3s 
constitute a form of privatization of public sector work, they are a threat to 
public employees. 
Pension plan investment in P-3s can mean financing the loss of plan 
member jobs or, more commonly, the jobs of members of the same public sector 
union. Ironically, the investment would also result in the exit from the pension 
plan itself of any plan members directly affected, as their jobs in the public sector 
disappear. Less dramatically, P-3 projects may reduce opportunities for 
promotion, or transfer, of plan members because the project is no longer within 
the public sector. And the privatization or P-3 project may negatively influence 
the future bargaining position of the union and the job security of its members 
who are still employed in the public sector.  
It is unreasonable to expect union pension plans to provide investment 
capital to P-3s at the expense of their own members. And, while funding the job 
losses of other union members may not have the same element of self-interest as 
protecting their own jobs, it still is important in the broader context of labour 
solidarity and the recognition by individual unions that they may need support 
from other unions in their campaigns against privatization initiatives. If it is 
wrong to make investments that threaten your own members’ jobs, it is no less 
wrong to do the same to the jobs of other unionized workers. 
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The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) has taken a clear position on the 
question of privatization of public services. In the June 2002 Convention it passed 
a number of resolutions on this topic: 
  
• The health care composite resolution called on the CLC to coordinate a 
national campaign to “…stop all forms of private public partnership and 
Private Finance Initiative in the health care sector…”, and “…return  
privatised health care services to public control…”  
• The composite resolution on water called on the CLC to: “…vigourously 
oppose privatisation and commercialization of fresh water resources…”  
• The composite resolution on energy called on the CLC to: “…organize to 
halt the deregulation and privatisation of electricity and other forms of 
energy and support the creation of improved publicly owned electricity 
systems.”  
 
In addition to the CLC’s position on this issue, individual public sector 
unions such as the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), the National 
Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE), the Public Service Alliance of 
Canada (PSAC), the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW), and many 
others have also passed clear policies against privatization and P-3 initiatives at 
both national and provincial conventions. Union nominated pension trustees 
should be mindful of the position of their unions and recognize that their actions 
– if they choose to invest in P-3s – have implications for the unions whose 
members they represent. 
 
UNION PUBLIC POLICY CRITICISMS OF P-3s 
 
The second set of arguments deals with union concerns that these 
initiatives are poor public policy that will damage the public sector and 
undermine the quality of public services and programs – values that are 
important to unions that see themselves as defenders of the public sector. Hence 
unions should not be providing financial support to policies that weaken the 
public sector. 
While the conclusions of public sector unions that P-3s are bad public 
policy may not be accepted by business interests and governments advocating P-
3s; nevertheless, the unions themselves are clear on this point.  
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The weaknesses of P-3s from a public policy perspective have been 
extensively documented by a number of analysts such as John Loxley of the 
University of Manitoba, Allyson Pollock of the University of London (UK) and 
various contributors to studies by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 
(CCPA).8 Some of the main objections can be listed as follows: 
 
• P-3s are almost always more expensive to finance than regular 
government borrowing. This is because governments generally have a 
better credit rating than private firms and, therefore, pay much lower 
interest costs – a major issue on capital intensive projects. The inflated 
borrowing costs of P-3s leave an enormous – and unnecessary – burden 
for future generations 
• The experience of many P-3s, especially in the UK where the idea largely 
originated, has been one of frequent and often very large cost over-runs.  
• There is a common misconception that P-3s are simply another way to 
finance the construction of major capital projects. However, most P-3s 
also involve multi-decade contracts for operation, maintenance and 
staffing by the private proponent – work that has, historically, normally 
been performed by public employees.  
• Because P-3s usually have such lengthy terms, they limit policy options 
for future elected governments. A child in Grade 8 today will be 50 years 
old by the time the proposed RAV P-3 contract has concluded.  
• P-3s may hide, but do not reduce public debt. Private financing is debt 
financing. It is a source of borrowing which must be repaid. It is 
disingenuous for governments to borrow through P-3s at higher interest 
rates to conceal their debt obligations, or to structure repayments on the 
basis of low payments at the beginning followed by ballooning costs later 
in the term of the contract. 
• P-3s must provide profit for investors. This means that that less of the 
public revenue stream allocated to them actually goes to fund services for 
the public.  
• There are normally significant transaction costs in arranging P-3s. 
Investment brokers, bankers, consultants and accounting firms are strong 
proponents of this approach precisely because it provides them with 
opportunities to acquire significant brokerage and consulting fees 
associated with the various elements of a P-3 transaction.  
• The commercial secrecy normally demanded by private investors 
undermines public accountability (for example: even the recently elected 
Liberal Government of Ontario has been reluctant to release all the 
contract documents on the Ontario P-3 hospitals). 
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• The new, or increased, user fees which often are built into P-3 proposals 
(such as Ontario’s Highway 407, the New Brunswick toll highway, the 
proposed – and now postponed – sale of the Coquihalla highway, or 
private health services) create inequities among users, forcing some 
citizens to pay more for public services than others or allowing those with 
more money to gain privileged access.  
• Employees of P-3s are in the private sector. While some senior managers 
do well, most other employees do not receive the same level of 
compensation or job security of public employees. Moreover, in many 
service areas, they may not be unionized. One of the key elements of cost 
reduction in service-based P-3s is low wages. 
• Inclusion of the private sector in the planning and funding of public 
projects can distort the planning process and undermine the public 
benefits of the projects. Concerns about protecting investor profits may 
outweigh concerns about quality of public service or fair treatment of 
employees.  
• P-3s open the door to challenges under international trade treaties. Once 
public services are brought into the market place, the disciplines of trade 
agreements apply, facilitating foreign control and further limiting the 
ability of future governments to take steps to protect the public interest.  
• P-3s do not transfer nearly as much risk as their proponents claim, 
leaving the public ‘holding the bag’ when cost over-runs occur as they 
often have done. 
 
THE PITFALLS OF PENSION PLAN INVESTMENTS IN P-3s 
 
The third area of concern with P-3s is based on questions about how 
important – and how sound – they are as investments. In other words is 
investing in P-3s likely to have a significant impact on the overall performance of 
pension plans? And, are they as safe and secure as their proponents believe? 
Despite the media hype around P-3 projects they do not – at present - 
account for a significant dollar value of investment opportunities within Canada. 
While there are issues associated with the diminishing number of Canadian 
companies on the TSX, P-3s are very unlikely to make a significant dent in this 
problem.  
Let us look at the question of risk in more detail. Proponents of P-3s 
argue that they transfer risk from taxpayers to private investors. If a P-3 is 
successfully structured – according to this rationale – it should transfer a 
significant share of budget; planning & design; environmental; schedule; labour 
relations; insolvency; construction claims; system integration; legal; operating 
performance; and customer usage risk from the public to private investors. If the 
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public rationale for P-3s is accurate, the investors are exposing themselves to 
significant risks. Presumably, if governments are doing their homework in 
drafting the contracts, they will ensure that such ‘risk transfer’ actually does take 
place. In other words if P-3 proponents are to be taken at their word, the 
investments are inherently risky. 
Many P-3s are themselves the result of drastic – and controversial – 
changes to public policies which, in themselves, create risk, both to governments 
and to P-3 investors. While some governments may support P-3s, many members 
of the public, including trade unionists, consumers/customers and community 
organizations strongly oppose them. Such opposition means these projects are 
controversial and often highly politicized. It is, arguably, imprudent for pension 
plans to expose themselves, unnecessarily, to criticisms arising from 
controversial – indeed what many would argue as misguided – public policy 
decisions 
 The best example of some of the political risks associated with 
privatization initiatives is the chaotic investment climate in the electrical energy 
sector following the deregulation and privatization of electric systems in the 
United States and in some Canadian provinces.  
 In the mid-1990s, investments in this sector were the ‘flavour of the 
month’. There was great enthusiasm for putting pension funds into emerging, 
privately owned, independent power projects and into the numerous spin-off 
energy services associated with a deregulated, privatized energy market. But the 
ensuing California energy crisis, followed quickly by crises in Alberta, the 
Northeast U.S. and Ontario quickly dampened enthusiasm for this sector, a 
development reinforced by the exposés of the machinations of Enron and other 
energy companies and confirmed in the snowstorm of litigation by governments 
and victimized consumers. The junk bond status of many power projects should 
discourage any prudent pension investor from getting involved in electricity P-
3s.  
P-3s may also entail significant “political” and “legal” risks for pension 
plans. They have been challenged by a wide range of affected interests – such as 
unions, consumer groups, opposition political parties, the media and advocacy 
groups. These challenges can embroil the projects in court actions as well as 
public protests of varying kinds. 
Recent examples of legal risk include the successful court challenge by 
CUPE and the Commercial, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) of 
the privatization of Hydro One in Ontario, the recent court challenges by CUPE 
and Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) against the Ontario P-3 
hospitals, the successful community challenges against the Halifax Harbour 
water treatment P-3, the successful legal challenge against the Maple Ridge 
downtown redevelopment P-3, the class action lawsuit filed against the Highway 
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407 P-3, the successful community campaigns against the Seymour and 
Kamloops water treatment P-3s and many more.  
 Political, or “election risk”, is also an increasing problem for Canadian P-
3s. For example, in New Brunswick the tolls on the Trans Canada highway 
project became a big election issue and contributed to the defeat of the Liberal 
government. The new Tory government replaced them with “shadow tolls” 
which are not as certain a source of revenue for the company as they depend on 
the Government’s willingness and ability to pay. Proposed P-3 hospitals in 
Ontario became a big issue in the recent election and the new Liberal 
government has indicated it will ‘adjust’ the P-3 arrangements on the basis of 
what it believes to be in the public interest.  
 Investors looking for absolute “certainty” will not find it in P-3s. Changes 
in Ministers responsible, changes in the legislative environment and changes in 
government after elections can all impact the profitability and security of these 
investments. Ontario’s Highway 407, which has often been touted as an example 
of a highly successful P-3, has been the subject of a major court dispute between 
the provincial government and the Spanish led consortium that owns it. The 
dispute is over whether the government or the company has the right to 
determine increases in tolls. The issue resulted in the European Union (EU) 
threatening to end negotiations for a new trade agreement with Canada if 
Ontario did not abandon its claim. 
 Several provincial Auditor Generals have criticized their respective 
governments for failing to carry out ‘due diligence’ before entering into P-3s. For 
example the Nova Scotia Auditor General raised serious concerns about the 
contract for P-3 schools. Similarly, the New Brunswick Auditor General was 
sharply critical of the Trans Canada Highway P-3 deal. Such criticisms can, in 
turn, lead governments to restructure these deals or abandon them entirely, 
again underlining the potential risks involved for investors.  
Underlying such criticisms is the propensity of politicians to look at P-3s 
as a short term fix for their budgets, a perspective very much encouraged by 
promoters of P-3s. While it is not always possible to keep future liabilities ‘off the 
books’, given changes in accounting rules in some provinces, quite often the 
payment structure of P-3s can be structured to keep annual payments – and 
budget allocations – low in the first few years of the contract. By deferring the 
real costs to future years, many politicians calculate that they will be long out of 
office by the time the bills really begin to bite, leaving future governments – and 
taxpayers – to pick up the financial mess they have left behind. However, once 
taxpayers realize the extent to which such deals unnecessarily push up costs they 
– or the provincial auditors – begin demanding that governments revise, or 
cancel, the unreasonable costs of these P-3 contracts, as the preceding examples 
of provincial audits illustrate.  
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CAN PENSION FUNDS SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE WITHOUT 
SUPPORTING P-3s?  
 
Pension funds can – and should – support public infrastructure projects, 
but not in the way proponents of P-3s suggest. Government bonds have been – 
and remain – an important area for pension fund investment. While the rate of 
return may not be as high as more risky ventures, they provide very secure 
investments. The Federal Government and virtually all provinces have the 
capacity to borrow to fund needed infrastructure or other public projects. 
Similarly, recent research by Enid Slack of York University indicates that 
Canadian municipalities also have considerable capacity to borrow. Debt charges 
as a percentage of local government revenues have been in significant decline 
since 1988.  
 Likewise, the ratio of government debt to GDP is low – and decreasing – 
at the federal level and in a number of provinces. Governments in Canada have a 
strong capacity to borrow for needed public infrastructure. Moreover, for those 
provinces who feel they cannot afford to borrow in the normal way due to their 
current level of debt, it is highly questionable whether they should even be 
considering the more expensive option of using P-3s.  
Although P-3s can create short term construction employment – and 
obviously the building trades have a legitimate interest in additional 
construction jobs – conventional government contracts can do the same. And it is 
more likely that governments will impose fair wages or other conditions that 
assist building trades unions than their private counterparts.  
If public pension plans are interested in providing financing in support of 
public infrastructure, they are still able to use traditional options, such as bonds 
and other lending instruments. They can thereby contribute to economic 
development and construction employment without supporting privatization 
 It is questionable for governments to favour expensive P-3 financing over 
normal borrowing simply to appease those who believe that the optics of 
reducing government borrowing are more important than the reality of the 
actual costs to taxpayers of the money borrowed. This is especially true with 
respect to major capital projects where a one percent difference in the cost of 
borrowing can translate into tens of millions of dollars in extra costs over the life 
of a 20 or 30 year contract. 
 Provincial and federal governments can also introduce policy changes 
that would make it cheaper for other parts of the public sector (e.g., 
municipalities in some provinces) that may not have the same credit ratings to 
borrow on the bond market from pension plans. These changes include: 
 
• Expanding risk pooling mechanisms such as municipal financing authorities 
to cover municipalities across Canada.  
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• Establishing dedicated funds through which federal and provincial 
governments – and Crown agencies – could provide opportunities for 
pension funds to loan money for public infrastructure renewal.  
• Changing the mandate of the Canada Pension Plan investment board to 
encourage additional lending to publicly owned and operated infrastructure 
projects.  
 
There are still many untapped investment opportunities in Canada that 
pension plans can fruitfully explore, including: real estate, financial services, 
forestry, petroleum, retail, diamond mines, gas pipelines, housing, film, tourism, 
technology and other areas. A thorough review of investment alternatives 
indicates that there are far more opportunities in the areas cited above than there 
are in the P-3 category.  
Rather than simply reacting to the overtures of those promoting P-3 
investments, pension plans need to look actively for other, equally effective 
investment opportunities. Trustees should resist pressure from governments – 
especially the provincial governments in the provinces in which their pensions 
are based – to invest in P-3s. If union trustees succumb to government pressure, 
it will be easier for governments to implement privatization programs and 
neutralize union objections. The question for union trustees is whether it is worth 
the candle to support investments that are quite marginal in terms of their share 
of the overall portfolio, given the other adverse consequences associated with 
union support for such investments? 
 
CONCLUSION: THERE ARE BETTER OPTIONS 
 
P-3s are problematic from the perspective of unions directly affected in 
the public sector, from a broader public policy perspective and from an 
investment perspective. Given the very small proportion of overall pension plan 
portfolios currently invested in P-3s and given the fact that such investments are 
not likely to make up more than a small proportion of the overall investment 
pool, the central question is whether it is worth the candle for pension trustees to 
abandon their moral high ground and engage in decisions that conflict with the 
interests of union members and the public they serve. 
P-3s should not be at the top of pension trustees’ list of potential 
investments. Rather, trustees should focus on other, more secure – and less 
controversial – ways to invest pension funds. Historically, many unions have 
used pension funds to invest in co-op housing, local industry and ethically 
responsible firms and projects. While this paper is not about ethical investment 
opportunities, it is clear that pension trustees in many pension plans have 
succeeded in developing portfolios that reflect these broader, socially responsible 
values and aspirations of plan members. 
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Pension trustees do not need pensioners protesting at the doors of their 
offices about the public policy and employment consequences of their 
investments. They do need to show imagination and creativity in developing 
portfolios that respect the interests and wishes of plan members. Although this 
paper has only scratched the surface on many of these issues, hopefully it 
supports the case that union pension trustees, especially in public sector plans 
should be wary of investments in privatizations and P-3 initiatives.  
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